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DEDUCTIVE VERIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EVENT-DRIVEN ARCHITECTURE 
The current paper presents the technology of processing of requirements for systems with event-driven archi-
tecture. The technology consists of the stages of formalization, formal verification and conversion to design 
specifications. The formalization is the formal description of events as formal specifications called basic pro-
tocols. The consistency and completeness of basic protocols, safety properties and user-defined properties are 
verified. The deductive tools for dynamic and static checking are used for detection of properties violation. The 
method of enlargement allows reducing the complexity of proving and solving. Formal presentation of re-
quirements allows converting them to SDL\UML specifications and generating the test suite. The technology is 
realized in IMS system and applied in more than 50 projects of telecommunication, networking, micropro-
cessing and automotive systems. 
Requirements capturing stage in 
software development process 
Requirements capturing technology 
has become as a part of software development 
process not long ago. The advantages of such 
stage are the following: 
 a detection on the earlier stages of a 
development of the deep hidden errors that 
could cause the re-planning or redesign. It 
could save the efforts of the test group and 
reduce the probability of financial losses in 
software projects; 
 an automatic generation of a test 
suit from the formal presentation of require-
ments for future model; 
 an automatic generation of a code 
or design specifications on the high levels of 
abstraction; 
 near 60-70% of discrepancies, gaps 
and ambiguities in requirements are detected 
during the formalization stage. 
Last years, special languages for re-
quirements description have been developed. 
They are such as Promela [1] that allows to 
describe a system of an interacting automata 
for SPIN model checking tool [2], and User 
Requirement Notation (URN) [3] recom-
mended by International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) and for which the traversal 
mechanism of models on UCM language (a 
functional subset of URN language) has been 
described [4]. On the other hand, an interest 
to  deductive  methods for  requirements veri-
fication  has  considerably  increased.  In  this  
 
 
 
 
category, the most known tools are Hets [5], 
which uses common algebraic specification  
language (CASL) [6], STeP [7], PVS [8]. In 
2002, ISO completed a standardization of Z-
notation [9], which has been developed since 
1974 and proved as a powerful and usable 
notation for specification [10] and verification 
of software systems [11, 12]. 
There are two stages in requirements 
capturing process: 
 a formalization of requirements; 
 a verification of formal require-
ments specifications. 
Usually the requirements for system 
are presented as a set of documentation which 
contains the informal text with figures, tables, 
diagrams. It describes the behavior of reactive 
system as the set of reactions of system or as 
the interaction between its components. The 
first stage is the formalization of requirements 
where the formal specifications are created 
manually. These specifications are called 
basic protocols [13, 14]. The second stage 
includes the work with verification tools that 
accepts the formalized requirements as the 
input and generates verdict in which the set  
of findings is described. Every finding is ac-
companied by counterexample which leads to 
the violation.  
Specific of our approach is the usage 
of deductive tools and symbolic modeling in 
verification process. It allows working with 
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the set of scenarios of a system behavior and 
with the set of values involved in formaliza-
tion as opposed to traditional model checking 
techniques where preference is given to con-
crete values. With this purpose the deductive 
tools such as proving and solving machines 
for different theories are used in this technol-
ogy. The main previous results of authors are 
described in [13 – 15].  
Basic protocol language 
We deal with the set of reactions of 
system presented as event-driven behavior. 
The reactive system consists of agents which 
could be considered as emitters and consum-
ers. Every requirement presents some local 
description and performs some action. Every 
agent in system has attributes which define 
the agent type. 
The model of a system is defined as a 
transition system which has the formulas of 
some typed logic language L as states. So this 
is a symbolic model. Some functional and 
predicate symbols of this language are inter-
preted over their type domains like an arith-
metical operations and relations. Other sym-
bols have types defined over fixed domains 
but are uninterpreted. They are called attrib-
utes and their values or properties could be 
changed during the system functioning.  
The language L used in verification 
system is implemented so far [15] contains 
integer, real, enumerated, Boolean and sym-
bolic types with linear arithmetic operations 
and inequalities for an arithmetic types, logi-
cal connectors for Booleans and equality for 
all types. The domain for symbolic type is the 
set of terms with distinguished set of con-
structors and access operations. Arrays are 
considered as functions with restricted do-
mains for indices. 
Every reaction of system could be pre-
sented by the following entities: 
 trigger event; 
 waiting state; 
 changing of environment state; 
 actions caused by trigger event. 
It could be described by means of the 
basic protocol which contains three compo-
nents – precondition, action and postcondi-
tion. Precondition is the formula in basic  
language L. Basic protocol is applicable if 
this formula is true for given state of envi-
ronment. Postcondition is the changing of at-
tributes. It could consist of the formula in 
language L or the imperative statements like 
assignment. Action is the list of operations 
performing by agent. Basic protocol with its 
three components could be presented as 
MSC-diagrams [16]. 
 
Fig. 1. Example of the basic protocol 
The diagram presents the source re-
quirement: 
“Upon receiving of signal RELE_ON 
in warming mode when the temperature ex-
ceeds 50 degrees the device should change  
the mode into  cooling  and set the  tempera-
ture in 40 degrees.”  
The set of actions performing by the 
agent “Device” is presented by MSC-
statements like receiving the message and 
MSC-action which is titled as “Mode Chang-
ing”. The formulas of precondition and post-
condition define the changing of symbolic 
state of the environment presented by attrib-
utes Mode and T. 
The process of formalization of re-
quirements is definition of waiting states of 
system behavior where the set of triggers is 
awaited and the changing of environment 
states  caused  by trigger event. This  appro-
ach is very convenient, because software de-
signer typically specify system requirements 
as a set of possible behavior fragments ex-
pressing  the  system  functionalities, and ba-
sic  protocols  resemble such natural language 
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requirements statementsused in engineering 
practice. The only difference is the using of 
the formal language instead of a natural lan-
guage.  
Symbolic modelling of requirements 
If we will determine the initial state 
0f  of system as some initial formula we can 
apply basic protocol for this formula by the 
following way. 
 define the applicability of basic 
protocol or satisfiability of precondition and 
symbolic state of environment; 
 compute the new formula f  by 
means of special function called predicate 
transformer [15] that has current symbolic 
state of environment and postcondition as ar-
guments. 
Applying the basic protocols we could 
obtain the set of histories. Each history is pre-
sented by a sequence: 
0 1 2f f f    
Every formula if  is the symbolic state 
of system and process of generation of such 
histories presents symbolic modeling of re-
quirements. In that way we can simulate the 
work of system obtaining different scenario  
of system behavior [13]. 
Symbolic modeling [17] of require-
ments is used for definition of reachability of 
some property in the system behavior. Prop-
erty is reachable if we can reach such sym-
bolic state of system which is consistent with 
this property that is the conjunction of the 
property and the state is satisfiable. We can 
check also the reachability of violation of 
user-defined property. For example, we can 
check whether some safety property S is  
violated. If during symbolic modeling we 
reach the state that is the formula f  and  
f& ~  S  is satisfiable then we’ve detect 
safety violation. 
There are the following properties that 
could be verified: 
 inconsistency. Formula of incon-
sistency could be defined statically and 
checking of satisfiability of this formula gives 
the possibility to detect the non-determinism 
in requirements;     
 incompleteness. Static proving of 
incompleteness formula detects the possible 
candidates for deadlocks in the system. 
Launching of symbolic modeling tools de-
fines the reachability of deadlock with coun-
terexample given as MSC trace; 
 safety. The safety violations also 
could be detected by proving with presenta-
tion of counterexample leading to this finding. 
Verification system 
The verification system was devel-
oped by authors where the symbolic model-
ing of formal requirements specifications  
and proving of mentioned  above static prop-
erties was provided. Special deductive sys-
tem has been developed for this purpose.  
It contains the proving machine and solver 
for integer and real arithmetic based on the 
algorithms of Fourier–Motzkin and Press-
burger and proving machine with solver for 
enumerated and symbolic types. The input  
of system is the formalized requirements as  
a set of basic protocols. User could input the 
properties of safety which could be checked. 
Static checker prove the completeness, con-
sistency and safety and if a violation has 
been detected then the system is trying to 
reach the violation by forward and backward 
symbolic modeling [15]. It also gives the 
counterexample as a scenario of system be-
havior in the case of reachability of the find-
ing. There is a scheme of requirements pro-
cessing technology below:  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Requirements processing technology 
 
The input of the system is the source 
documentation which contains the require-
ment  in a text form.  There could be thou-
sands of pages with figures, tables and other 
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non-formal descriptions. Verification engi-
neer formalizes the information as the set  
of the system reactions. He defines the envi-
ronment as the set of agents with its attrib-
utes. Then he tries to find descriptions of  
external  triggers for  system in  documenta-
tion which causes the changing of environ-
ment and creates the basic protocols. He 
could use the incremental verification or  
create the whole  set of  basic  protocols. Af-
ter  launching of verification system the veri-
fication  verdict could be  obtained  and re-
sults are presented to customer. Customer 
should correct or refine the requirements and 
the verification stage will continue until ab-
sence of violations.  
The other possibility of verification 
system is to generate the design specification 
like SDL/UML models. The result of genera-
tion could be used in further refinement and 
detailing of model. 
Invariants techniques 
Originally basic protocols are not or-
dered. Therefore after applying basic proto-
col and transforming current state by predi-
cate transformer, any other protocol can be 
applied. So we should check the applicability 
for all basic protocols, and each check re-
quires the use of deductive system. The 
symbolic technology allows reducing the ex-
pensive proving and solving processing dur-
ing the modeling of a system behavior by 
means of computing invariant properties.  
In real industrial projects there can be 
thousands of basic protocols, so to reduce the 
search time for the next applicable basic pro-
tocol is an actual problem. To make this 
search more efficient the succession relation 
2DF   is computed statically for the set of 
basic protocols. This relation by definition 
must satisfy the following property: basic 
protocol 'd  can be applied after d in some 
trace starting from the initial state of the sys-
tem  DLS ,  only if   Fdd ', . 
The first approximation F0 of succes-
sion relation is the following: 
0)(')1()',( 0  xxdFdd   
Here )(' x  is the precondition of 'd . 
Let us prove that F0 is a succession relation. 
Let there is a trace where 'd  can be applied 
after d. This trace must contain fragment 
a a
s s s

    such that '.''
'
sss
dd
  From the 
monotonicity of predicate transformer it  
follows  
 0)(''),1(')( xxsdssd   
.0)(')1(  xxd 
 
Therefore   0', Fdd  . Succession re-
lation 0F  can be strengthened using invariant 
properties of requirements. Formula   is a 
preinvariant  of  a  basic protocol d if it is va-
lid  each time  before  application of this pro-
tocol. Formula   is a postinvariant of a basic 
protocol d  if it is valid each time after appli-
cation of protocol d . A formula  1d  is a 
postinvariant of d . The succession relation 
can be strengthened by adding arbitrary invar-
iants as conjunction members to  1d .If we 
know some postinvariant of a protocol B  
then we can  check  the  consistency  of  this  
invariant with the applicability conditions  
for all  protocols  and  reduce the set of suc-
cessors of B  to only those protocols for 
which these conditions are consistent with 
postinvariant of B  (conjunction is satisfia-
ble). Therefore the  network of basic proto-
cols can be constructed and the reachability 
search is  reduced  from the  search in an  in-
finite tree to the search in a graph which is 
much more efficient. 
A protocol B  is called initial, if the 
condition of its applicability is consistent with 
the initial state. If preinvariant of a protocol 
B  is 0, and it is not initial, then B  is not 
reachable from the initial state. 
The computation of the strongest in-
variants gives the possibility to define the 
strongest succession relation preliminary and 
avoid the expensive redundant proving and 
solving during simulation. In this case the 
reachability of a protocol coincides with the 
existence of a path from the initial protocol. 
The reachability of a property also can be 
computed without trace generating. For this 
purpose one must check the consistency of 
this property with the postcondition of all 
reachable protocols.  
Формальні методи розробки програмного забезпечення 
58 
Unfortunately, it is possible that the 
strongest invariant does not exist (not ex-
pressible in the logic language). In this case 
we can be satisfied by computing finite ap-
proximations  of invariants. This  computa-
tion is performed solving corresponding  
equations for minimal fixed points.  
The invariants that were computed 
during verification could be used on the  
step of design. For continuation of work  
with design specifications it is necessary  
to move to the lower level of abstraction  
and the refinement of specifications shall  
be  provided on the  level of  design  specifi-
cations. 
 
Fig. 3.  Checking of integrity of requirements 
and design specifications 
The design specifications could be la-
beled by invariants and it will give the possi-
bility to check whether the  refining  specifi-
cation correspond to source requirements. 
There are two options. These invariants that 
are called annotations could be checked  
during modeling of design specifications if 
such simulation tools exist. From the other 
side it  could  be  prove by tool which is de-
veloping by authors – Insertion Modeling 
System [18], where annotations could be 
proved  during  symbolic  modeling  of  de-
sign  specifications. The other option is to de-
compose updated design specification into 
basic protocols and repeat verification.  
During this stage the invariants will be  
updated and the new set of annotations for 
design  specifications  could  be  formed. 
Enlargement technique 
The set of basic protocols could be en-
capsulated as enlarged basic protocol if it 
composes the connected component in an ori-
ented  graph which presents  the succession 
relation of basic protocols. If  this relation has 
been strengthened by invariants it is possible 
to define pre- and postcondition for enlarged 
basic protocol. If the folded  connected com-
ponent will be encapsulated to single node in 
graph then the set of input and output arrows 
could be defined for it. We can consider the 
set of preinvariants  1 2, ,P P  for successors 
as the input arrows and correspondingly the 
set of postinvariant   1 2, ,Q Q   for prede-
cessors as output arrow. So the  precondition 
for enlarged basic  protocol  could  be defined 
as  disjunction  21 PP P1. The  postcon-
dition could be defined as disjunction 
 2211 QPQP P1. 
If we hide the set of basic protocols  
into the enlargement basic protocol it is pos-
sible to reduce the significant interleaving  
and verify the properties for different subsets 
of basic protocols. There are the following 
possibilities: 
 enlarging of an agent behavior. If 
we have some agents interacting one with an-
other  then we can  encapsulate the behavior 
of a single agent into the enlarged basic pro-
tocol. It gives the possibility to detect  
the properties violations on the high level ab-
straction that reduces the complexity of com-
putations; 
 incremental verification. Some ini-
tial part of basic protocols could be verified 
separately. After verification of this part it 
could be inserted into the enlarged basic pro-
tocol. It gives the possibility to avoid expo-
nential explosion in the number of projects; 
 features interaction. After verifica-
tion of feature it is possible to encapsulate it 
into the enlarged basic protocol and continue 
processing with the other features. It could 
give the possibility to avoid repetition of veri-
fication of common parts of system; 
 enlarging of the set of agents. The 
group of agent could be folded into one entity 
that presents the enlarged agent. The interac-
tion between agents could be reduced to the 
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interaction between enlarged agents and prove 
the absence of violation on such level of ab-
straction. 
Applications 
There are more than 50 industrial ex-
amples which were processed by verification 
system [19]. According to the rules of cus-
tomers, the details of these projects couldn’t 
be published. The examples of verification of 
several commonly known algorithms are pre-
sented below. These are telecommunication 
systems and protocols, telephony, automotive 
systems, networking, microprocessing and 
other projects. Process of verification started 
from formalization of requirements as a set of 
basic protocols. It is interesting that 70% of 
errors, discrepancies and gaps in requirements 
were detected during formalization. Verifica-
tion engineer should not be as a specialist in 
subject domain which belongs to verified sys-
tem. He considers the requirements as abstract 
statements which should be consistent. Such 
methodic could detect missed logic content 
and avoid the ambiguity in understanding of 
requirements by developers. 
The more deep hidden errors have 
been detected after launching of verification 
system. The findings detected during verifica-
tion are presented by counterexamples which 
show the scenario leading to violation. 
Usage of enlargement techniques in 
verification of Hard Handoff feature in tele-
communication protocol. 
The requirements for the feature of 
telecommunication protocol present 1150 
pages in event-driven style. Each requirement 
presents the consuming of messages by agent, 
processing of its parameters and sending of 
messages to other agents. There are 4 differ-
ent types of agents that are considered in this 
protocol – Mobile Station, Base Station, Mo-
bile Manager and Mobile Station Communi-
cator. Actually the requirements were pre-
pared for Mobile Manager component. Hard 
Handoff feature is considered as transition of 
mobile phone from one cell to another and all 
messages from phones and bases are pro-
cessed by Mobile Manager. There is the num-
ber of features such as parsing of message, 
calculation of some parameters which could 
be implemented by programming with state-
ments like nested cycles, non-linear functions. 
It is hard and unnatural to implement it by 
basic protocols. These features could be pre-
sented as folded entities which could be for-
malized as enlarged basic protocols and be 
refined on the next level of abstraction which 
is design specifications. 
All these requirements were formal-
ized as 245 basic protocols. 114 findings have 
been detected during formalization. After ver-
ification 36 findings have been detected as 
safety violations. There were 14 findings of 
incompleteness in systems presented by the 
deadlocks with corresponding counterexam-
ples. 4 inconsistencies presented as non-
determinism were detected. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The set of agents interacting in Hard 
Handoff feature of telecommunication 
protocol 
But the total verification of feature 
without methods of enlarging entailed expo-
nential explosion even with usage of only 3 
Mobile Managers. The following enlargement 
of agents was used: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Enlargement in Hard Handoff feature 
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Such formalization was verified dur-
ing one hour and allowed to detect all find-
ings for Mobile Manager requirements.   
Feature interaction in Plain Old Tele-
phone System (POTS) 
The requirements for POTS presented 
as use-cases where every use-case presents 
the single feature. There are 10 different fea-
tures which are intersected and the verifica-
tion of all features  together could entail ex-
ponential  explosion. It was  possible to en-
capsulate  the  already  verified  parts of sys-
tem into  enlarged  entity and  continue  veri-
fication only with other parts of system. All 
features presents interaction of such agents  
as  Switch,  Service  Point  Control and  Op-
eration System. For example the feature  
“IN Freephone Billing” repeats part of the 
main feature “Basic Call”. The intersected 
parts could be folded into enlarged entity  
and verification was performed only for parts 
of new feature. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Enlarging in POTS 
UCM (Use Case Map) diagram pre-
sents the two features that were decompose to 
basic protocols and separated for two sets. 
One set contained the basic protocols which 
belongs to “Basic Call” feature and to the 
both ones. The second set belongs to the “IN 
Freephone Billing” feature. 
The first set was presented as enlarged 
basic protocol. The verification was provided 
for enlarged basic protocol and the second set 
of basic protocols. The other features could be 
also verified by such way with those features 
with which the intersection exists.  
Enlarging of agents in Generic Attrib-
ute Registration Protocol (GARP) 
GARP protocol is a kind of multicast 
protocol where the processors are registered 
into groups in network. The network is pre-
sented by the set of domains which contain 
the certain number of processors. Every pro-
cessor could create, join or leave the group. It 
should send the signal in the network by the 
corresponding path. The problem is to prove 
the absence of deadlocks in described algo-
rithm for arbitrary topology of network and 
arbitrary number of agents. Every processor 
could be in some state and its transitions are 
defined by special state machine. The follow-
ing enlargement was proposed for avoiding of 
exponential explosion. 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Enlargement of agents in GARP 
We consider every enlarged entity as 
the set of agents in some state. When any pro-
cessor performed transition it becomes the 
member of the other enlarged entity. Such 
abstraction allowed proving the absence of 
deadlocks statically inasmuch as it is equiva-
lent to formalization without enlarging and 
corresponding theorem is proved. 
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